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Cash vs. solar power: An experimental investigation of the remuneration-related design of community solar offerings

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This paper investigates the effect of two different community solar remuneration models on the overall willingness
to buy of Swiss electricity customers (n ¼ 496). Based on practical observation, the two main remuneration
models that dominate today’s implementation landscape for community solar were identified. The first
of the former delivers solar power directly from community solar plants, while the second delivers financial
compensation instead of solar power. A between-subject-design experiment applying pro-environmental
behavior as approximation for intrinsic motivation demonstrated that remuneration schemes which avoid
mentioning financial benefits and instead compensate customers with the solar power are particularly attractive
to green electricity customers who have higher intrinsic motivation to consume pro-environmental electricity.
Offering financial benefits may even discourage these customers from participating in community solar. On the
other hand, offering financial benefits appeals to default electricity customers whose intrinsic motivation for proenvironmental
behavior is too weak to trigger a reaction to the ecological and local benefits of community solar
alone. When designing policies around community solar or implementing community solar projects, policy
makers and practitioners should thus carefully analyze the customer base and its composition in order to match
remuneration schemes to customer preferences.

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Ketersediaan

EJ2058

My Library

Tersedia

Informasi Detil

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Elsevier Ltd. : ., 2020

Deskripsi Fisik

11 p.

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

Energy Policy 138 (2020) 111216

Subyek

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Info Detil Spesifik

Ejurnal

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

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Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

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